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ARTICLE UPDATE
SEVENTH UPDATE TO COLORADO WATER LAW:
AN HISTORICAL OVERVIEW
THE HONORABLE GREGORY J. HOBBS, JR.
To provide our readers with the most up-to-date water law
information, the editors periodically include updates of works
previously published in the Water Law Review. The following is the
seventh update to Colorado Water Law: An Historical Overview,
Appendix-Colorado Water Law: A Synopsis of Statutes and Case Law,'
selected by the Honorable Gregory J. Hobbs, Jr.
Vance v. Wolfe
"While the term 'beneficial use' is undefined in the Colorado
Constitution, the 1969 Act defines it broadly as 'the use of that
amount of water that is reasonable and appropriate under reasonably
efficient practices to accomplish without waste the purpose for which
the appropriation is lawfully made.' Under the language of the 1969
Act, the CBM [Coalbed Methane] process 'uses' water - by extracting
it from the ground and storing it in tanks - to 'accomplish' a particular
'purpose' - the release of methane gas. The extraction of water to
facilitate CBM production is therefore a 'beneficial use' as defined in
the 1969 Act.
Arguing against this interpretation, the Engineers and BP'[British
Petroleum] assert that the use of the water during the CBM process
cannot be a 'beneficial' one because the water is merely a nuisance.
They stress that the goal of the CBM process is to capture the gas, not
the water. The water, they continue, is simply an unwanted byproduct
of the process. In sum, they question how the use of the water in this
case can be termed 'beneficial' when they consider it to be a
hindrance. . . . '[W]e disagree . . .
Vance v. Wolfe, 205 P.3d 1165, 1169 (2009) (citations omitted).
In fact, the presence of water and its subsequent extraction during
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CBM production is far more than an 'inevitable result.' Indeed,
presence and extraction of water are integral components to
entire CBM process. CBM producers rely on the presence of
water to hold the gas in place until the water can be removed and
gas captured. Without the presence and subsequent extraction of
water, CBM cannot be produced..

.

the
the
the
the
the

. While the Engineers and BP are

correct that no Colorado case has specifically held that water used
during CBM production is a beneficial use, this fact does not prevent
us from finding such a beneficial use where our case law and the
language of the 1969 Act so dictate.
Id. at 1170.
As the water court noted, the Ranchers' central concern is the
protection of their vested senior water rights. We agree with the
district court that our prior appropriation system exists to protect
water rights holders. Here, the extraction, storage, and reinjection of
water during CBM make the water inaccessible to other water rights
holders such as the Ranchers. When the water is stored in surface
tanks, a small quantity is lost to evaporation. At a later time, the water
is typically reinjected, via underground injection control wells, into
designated geologic formations that lie deeper than the aquifer from
which the methane is produced. Consequently, 'beneficial use' also
means use of water for a designated purpose - the result of which is
to make the water inaccessible to other water rights holders.
Id. at 1171.
We emphasize that determining the boundaries of 'beneficial use'
requires careful case-by-case factual analysis and our holding today
addresses the unique circumstances involved in CBM production. The
definition of 'beneficial use,' however, is a 'broad' one, and we agree
with the Ranchers that it is broad enough to cover the extraction of
water to facilitate CBM production. In rendering our decision, we
observe that the General Assembly may choose to make modifications
to the statutes in light of our opinion.
Id. at 1172.
In sum, while the production of oil and gas is subject to extensive
regulation by COGCC [Colorado Oil and Gas Conservation
Commission], it is also subject to the 1969 Act and the Ground Water
Act. And, as noted above, we find that the extraction of water to
facilitate CBM production is a beneficial use under those provisions."
Id. at 1173.
City of Aurora v. ACJ Partnership
"This appeal concerns a water court application in which the
Appellant, the City of Aurora ('Aurora'), sought conditional water
storage rights. Aurora appeals from the water court's order granting
partial summary judgment in favor of Opposer-Appellee Rangeview
Metropolitan District ('Rangeview'), and dismissing that part of
Aurora's application claiming conditional water storage rights in three

Issue 1I

ARTICLE UPDATE

161

disputed sites. These three sites significantly overlap reservoir sites
which Rangeview currently leases from the state. Under a lease
agreement, the Colorado State Board of Land Commissioners ('Land
Board'), which administers the land on which the disputed sites are
situated on behalf of the state, is required to convey rights-of-way to
Rangeview for construction of its reservoirs when such construction is
imminent. The water court ruled that, as a result of its contractual
obligations to Rangeview, the Land Board was precluded from
granting Aurora any access to the disputed sites. Thus, the water
court concluded that, as concerns the disputed sites, Aurora could
not satisfy the statutory 'can and will' requirement for a decree of
conditional water rights. The 'can and will' requirement mandates
that in order to establish a conditional water right, an applicant must
show that the waters can and will be diverted and beneficially used,
and that the project can and will be completed with diligence and
within a reasonable time. We affirm.
We hold that Aurora failed to demonstrate by a preponderance of
the evidence that there is a substantial probability that it can and will
gain access to the disputed sites. Because Aurora failed to advance
any genuine issue of material fact concerning its present or
prospective ability to access the disputed sites, we conclude that the
water court appropriately dismissed Aurora's claims for conditional
water storage rights in those sites on partial summary judgment. We
remand the case to the water court for proceedings consistent with
this opinion."
City of Aurora v. ACJ Partnership, 209 P.3d 1076, 1080 (2009)
(citations omitted).
Cotton Creek Circles, LLC v. Rio Grande Water Conservation District
"[T]he 1969 Act provides that '[t]he state engineer may adopt
rules and regulations to assist in, but not as a prerequisite to, the
performance of [the state engineer's] foregoing duties.' Rules and
regulations are designed to help administer tributary ground water to
ensure that enforcement is not arbitrary, that the rules will prevent
material injury to senior appropriators, and that the rules take into
consideration the means for achieving optimum use of ground
water ... Colorado has a long history of handling water issues
through adjudication rather than through administrative proceedings.
Dating back to the Adjudication Acts of 1879 and 1881, Colorado has
provided for judicial proceedings to administer water rights.
Although most other states direct water issues through administrative
procedures, in drafting the 1969 Act, the General Assembly decided
to maintain the system of adjudicative proceedings to handle the
determination of water rights. Moreover, as the water court noted,
the General Assembly did not require the state engineer to conduct a
public hearing on proposed rules, and regulations such as is required
by the Colorado Administrative Procedure Act ('CAPA'). Rather, the
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1969 Act . .. provides the opportunity for interested parties to protest
potential infringements on their water rights as the means to prevent
unreasonable exercises of administrative discretion by the state
engineer.
Cotton Creek Circles, LLC v. Rio Grande Water Conservation
District, 218 P.3d 1098, 1101-102 (2009) (citations omitted).
Because the type of proceeding at issue in the present case more
closely resembles a contested adjudication than a quasi-legislative
rulemaking, it follows that those parties who, in the discretion of the
presiding judge, prevailed on a significant issue and derived some
benefits sought by the litigation may be entitled to costs. Here, the
Proponents [two water districts and a water users association that
supported the rules] acted in concert with the state engineer to
successfully defend the proposed rules and regulations from the
Objectors' protests. The Proponents were thoroughly involved in the
extensive proceedings at issue and expended significant time and
effort in pursuing the ratification of the proposed rules and
regulations. We conclude that the water court's determination that
the Proponents were 'prevailing parties' for purposes of C.R.C.P.
54(d) was not manifestly arbitrary, unreasonable, or unfair. Therefore
it was not an abuse of discretion and we uphold that decision."
Id. at 1104-105.
Pagosa Water and Sanitation District v. Trout Unlimited (II)
"We uphold the Water Court's determination that a 50-year water
supply planning period to the year 2055 is reasonable. However, in
light of the standards we set forth in Pagosa I, we hold that the
evidence currently in the record does not support the amounts of
water contained in the remand conditional decree. The essential
function of the water court in a conditional decree proceeding is to
determine the amount of available unappropriated water for which
the applicant has established a need, a future intent, the ability to
actually use, and, under the "can and will" test, a substantial
probability that its intended appropriation will reach fruition....
In particular, the existing record in this case. lacks sufficient
evidentiary support for the following conditional decree provisions:
(1) provision no. 11.1.6, which provides for water releases to benefit
hypothetical recreational in-channel rights, instream flow rights
decreed to the Colorado Water Conservation Board, and bypass flow
requirements of any federal permits obtained for development of the
Dry Gulch Reservoir; (2) provision no. 31, which provides for a direct
flow diversion right into Dry Gulch storage of 100 cfs to account for
the uncertainty of federal bypass flow requirements; (3) provision no.
43, which provides for a direct flow diversion right of 50 cfs into the
Districts' water system for use anywhere in the Districts' service area;
and (4) provision no. 44, which provides for a storage right of 25,300
acre-feet of water annually in Dry Gulch Reservoir.
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Pagosa Water and Sanitation District v. Trout Unlimited (II), 219
P.3d 774, 777 (2009) (citations omitted).
[G]overnmental water supply entities have a limited exception
from the anti-speculation and beneficial use standards applicable to
non-governmental conditional water right appropriators. The
conditional appropriation must be consistent with the governmental
agency's reasonably anticipated water use requirements based on
substantiated projections of future growth within its service area and
only a reasonable planning period is allowed. In addition to
demonstrating non-speculative intent, a governmental agency must
satisfy the 'can and will' requirement in order to obtain a conditional
decree ...
Id. at 779.
The ultimate factual and legal issue in a governmental agency
conditional appropriation case involves how much water should be
conditionally decreed to the applicant above its currently available
water supply. A governmental entity has the burden of demonstrating
three elements in regard to its intent to make a non-speculativeconditional appropriation of unappropriated water: (1) what is a
reasonable water supply planning period; (2) what are the
substantiated population projections based on a normal rate of
growth for that period; and (3) what amount of available
unappropriated water is reasonably -necessary to serve the reasonably
anticipated needs of the governmental agency for the planning period
above its current water supply.
In the water court's application of the third element, we
articulated four non-exclusive considerations relevant to determining
the amount of the conditional water right (1) implementation of
reasonable water conservation measures during the planning period;
(2) reasonably expected land use mixes during the planning period;
(3) reasonably attainable per capita usage projections for indoor and
outdoor use based on the land use mixes during the planning period;
and (4) the amount of consumptive use reasonably necessary to serve
the increased population.
Id. at 780.
At least a part of the remand decree amount is ascribable to the
speculative recreational in-channel diversion, instream flow, and/or
bypass flow amounts we have discussed above. On remand from this
decision, the Water Court should take additional evidence and
determine what amounts of water for storage and direct flow
diversions are necessary to meet the Districts' reasonably anticipated
needs for the 2055 planning period above the existing baseline water
rights the Districts currently hold. The remand decree does not
contain a finding regarding the amount of annual dry year yield
available from the Districts' existing water rights.
Id. at 788.
[W]e reject the position of the Districts and amici municipal water
suppliers that they act in a legislative capacity when they make
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conditional water appropriations; thus, they argue that the courts owe
deference to the claimed amounts of water the suppliers deem
reasonably necessary for their future use. To the contrary, the
Colorado statutes and case law we have cited in Pagosa I and in this
opinion provide that both public and private appropriators must
carry the burden of proving their claims for a conditional decree.
While the General Assembly has made an accommodation to
governmental water suppliers by allowing their conditional
appropriations to be made and decreed for a future reasonable water
supply period in reasonably anticipated amounts, it has assigned to
the courts the responsibility to conduct the necessary proceedings for
these determinations under a de novo standard of review. . .
Id. at 788.
Well Augmentation Subdistrict v. City of Aurora
"We affirm the water court's requirement that WAS [Well
Augmentation Subdistrict of the Central Colorado Water
Conservancy District] provide replacement water for pre-2003
depletions that have a continuing injurious effect on surface waters.
Well Augmentation Subdistrict v. City of Aurora, 221 P.3d 399,
404 (2009) (citations omitted).
Water rights are decreed to structures and points of diversion in
specified amounts for beneficial uses. Water court approval of a plan
for augmentation allows a water right with a junior priority date to
divert out-of-priority, provided that the junior right supplies
additional augmentation water to offset the out-of-priority depletion.
Because water rights are 'kept in the name of the diversion or storage
structure, rather than by owner name, and water right transfers are
not recorded,' terms and conditions decreed by the water court attach
to the water right and follow it regardless of who may own or operate
the right. In the context of plans for augmentation, the water rights
included in the plan are augmented, and the court cannot approve a
plan if senior vested rights will be harmed through out-of-priority
diversions made by the water rights included in the plan, regardless of
ownership of the rights.
Here, when WAS filed the plan for augmentation ... it invoked
the water court's jurisdiction over the water rights included in the
plan. The water court then had a duty .. . to ensure that operation of
the plan would not prove injurious to senior vested water rights and
decreed conditional water rights. In order to fulfill this duty and
prevent harm to senior water rights, the water court conditioned
approval of the augmentation plan on the requirement that WAS
provide replacement water for pre-2003 depletions that are currently
affecting surface water conditions. Requiring WAS to provide
replacement water for such depletions is specifically aimed at
preventing injury to senior water rights, and is accordingly within the
scope of the proceedings outlined in [the 1969 Act]. Therefore, an
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analysis of 'the nature of the claim and the relief sought,' reveals that
requiring WAS to provide augmentation water for pre-2003
diversions presently affecting surface water conditions is directly
related to the plan for augmentation, and the water court therefore
had jurisdiction to impose such a requirement.
Id. at 409.
Here, certain wells contained in the WAS augmentation plan
engaged in out-of-priority pumping prior to the filing of the
augmentation plan application in 2003. The pumping of alluvial, or
tributary, wells reduces surface flows to the rivers to which the wells
are hydrologically connected. However, the time and amount of the
reduction depends on several factors, including the distance between
the well and the stream, the transmissibility of the aquifer, the depth
of the well, the time and volume of pumping, and return flow
characteristics. Because groundwater depletions can lag behind
surface water conditions by many years, the effects of a groundwater
depletion may not be felt by surface waters for long periods of time.
In this case, the water court found that certain pre-2003 depletions
have a continuing future impact on surface water conditions.
Therefore, as a term and condition to approval of the augmentation
plan, the water court ordered WAS to provide replacement water for
pre-2003 depletions that will continue to affect the river in the future."
Id. at 412.
Upper Eagle Regional Water Authority v. Wolfe
"The Authority argues, as a matter of law, that water court
retained jurisdiction.... can be invoked to remedy only actual injury
to a decreed water right. The Engineers and the CWCB counter
that. . . the water court's use of retained jurisdiction 'as is necessary
or desirable to preclude or remedy any such injury,' and the water
court should extend the period of retained jurisdiction for such time
as 'the nonoccurrence of injury shall not have been conclusively
established.' We agree with the Engineers and the CWCB.
We hold that.the water court erred in dismissing the petitions of
the Engineers and the CWCB in both of these cases. The petitions
allege sufficient facts which, if proved, meet the petitioners' burden of
going forward to show that injury has occurred or is likely to occur,
based on operational experience involving the out-of-priority
diversions and depletions covered by the augmentation plans.
Reviewing the petitions, the water court should have conducted
additional proceedings in both of these cases.
On remand, the Engineers and the CWCB have the burden of
going forward with sufficient evidence that injury has occurred or is
likely to occur because the existing decree provisions are inadequate
to preclude or remedy injury. If the Engineers and the CWCB
provide such evidence, the Authority must demonstrate non-injury
and the adequacy of existing decree provisions to preclude and
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remedy injury to other water rights. The water court should then
make findings of fact, conclusions of law, and decree revisions, as
appropriate, for the purpose of precluding and remedying injury to
vested water rights and decreed conditional water rights.
If the water court finds that not enough operational experience
exists to permit it to consider the question of injury or to conclusively
establish non-injury, it should extend the period of retained
jurisdiction by an additional specified period. . ."
Upper Eagle Regional Water Authority v. Wolfe, 230 P.3d 1203,
1206-207 (2010) (citations omitted).
V Bar Ranch LLC v. Cotton
"V Bar argues the operative date for purposes of determining the
land on which the water right may be used is the date of adjudication,
not the date of appropriation. Accordingly, V Bar argues that water
from Well No. 1 can be used to irrigate both the Southwest and
Northwest Quarters of Section 3 because, at the time of adjudication,
both Quarters were being irrigated with well water. We disagree. V
Bar's position disregards the significance of the beneficial use
contemplated at the time of the 1946 appropriation and embraces the
erroneous view that a lawful decree can be premised upon an
unlawful expansion of use. Because we determine that the scope of a
water right is defined by the intent of the appropriator at the time of
appropriation, we hold that the application of water from Well No. 1
to the Northwest Quarter of Section 3 represented an unlawful
expansion of use and the replacement well permit should have been
limited to irrigation of the Southwest Quarter.
V Bar Ranch LLC v. Cotton, 233 P.3d 1200, 1208 (2010) (citations
omitted).
In Colorado, appropriations of water for irrigation are made by
and for use on specific land. Water which was appropriated for use
on one parcel of land cannot be applied to new or different lands
without a decree issued by the water court allowing the change in use.
The amount of water appropriated is defined by the beneficial use to
which the water is put. "Beneficial use" is defined as 'that amount of
water that is reasonable. and appropriate under reasonably efficient
practices to accomplish without waste the purpose for which the
appropriation is lawfully made.' Consequently, because the amount of
water that is reasonable and appropriate must be based on the
purpose of the appropriation, the amount of acreage to be irrigated
and the location of the irrigation must be contemplated at the time of
the appropriation.
Id. at 1208.
V Bar requested, and the water court confirmed, an absolute
water right under a 1946 appropriation, which means that the water
right had been put to its intended beneficial use in 1946. Nothing in
the record indicates that the water right was appropriated in
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anticipation of future acquisition of the Northwest Quarter.
Consequently, because the water right was created upon the
completion of the appropriation, the scope of that right and the lands
upon which it may be exercised are defined by the beneficial use for
which the water was appropriated. Therefore, the water right at issue
is limited to irrigation of the Southwest Quarter, and, in order to
irrigate lands beyond the Southwest Quarter, V Bar must petition the
water court for a change decree recognizing a new situs for the
appropriation."
Id. at 1209.
City of Englewood v. Burlington Ditch, Reservoir and Land Co.
"We ... agree with the water court's finding that the Agreement is
neither a selective subordination agreement nor a general
subordination agreement. Englewood is incorrect in arguing that nocall agreements are a type of subordination agreement.... [A]n
appropriator may contract to make its priority inferior to another....
No-call agreements and subordination agreements are similar in that
senior appropriators in each are effectively contracting away .part of
the bundle of sticks that compose their water rights, with the general
result that water that could otherwise go to the senior appropriator is
made available to some or all junior appropriators. However, the
agreements are fundamentally different in terms of what is being
contracted away by the senior appropriator. In a subordination
agreement, 'the holder of an otherwise senior water right consents to
stand in order of priority behind another person or persons holding a
junior water right.' At its core, subordination 'is essentially a matter of
status between parties' and 'establishes priorities between those
parties by some means other than the automatic or statutory scheme:'
In contrast, a no-call agreement provides that a senior appropriator
will not place a call on a particular water right that it holds. Thus, a
no-call agreement contracts away the right to place a call to the Division
Engineer requesting more water to fulfill the senior right whereas a
subordination agreement contracts away the senior appropriator's
more senior priority status (either to specific junior appropriators in a
selective subordination or all junior appropriators in a general
subordination).
City of Englewood v. Burlington Ditch, Reservoir and Land Co.,
235 P.3d 1061, 1068 (2010) (citations omitted)
There is no requirement that a senior water right holder place a
call on the river to effectuate its water rights, or any statutory
authority for the State or Division Engineers to require the placement
of a call. Instead, we have explicitly recognized that a water right
holder may contractually choose to not request calls. on its rights."
Id. at 1069-070.
City of Aurora v. Northern Colorado Water Conservancy District
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"Colorado water law states that, in addition to other elements, an
applicant for an appropriative right of exchange must show that there
is no injury to the water rights of others when implementing the
exchange. Northern Water claims no injury to itself or its users from
Aurora's proposed PWP exchange reach.
Despite this, Northern Water claims that . .. the combined effect

of the WCA [Water Conservancy Act], the Repayment Contract, and
Northern Water's own rules supersedes this general law and gives
Northern Water the authority to deny any entity extra-district benefits
from the use of C-BT water. Some amount of C-BT [Colorado-Big
Thompson] water flows through Aurora's proposed exchange reach
outside the boundaries of the Northern Water district. Northern
Water contends that the inclusion of this water in Aurora's calculation
of the exchange potential of the exchange reach is prohibited and
that the resulting larger exchange potential is an indirect extra-district
benefit unlawfully derived from C-BT water.
City of Aurora v. Northern Colorado Water Conservancy District,
236 P.3d 1222, 1225 (2010) (citations omitted).
Northern Water claims no injury to its water rights from Aurora's
proposed PWP exchange reach, and.. . [our case law] prohibiting
extra-district indirect benefits pertains only to parties that contract
with Northern Water. Therefore, Northern Water cannot successfully
petition the water court to impose a condition that excludes any
possible C-BT flows in the exchange reach when Aurora calculates its
exchange potential."
Id. at 1226.
City and County of Broomfield v. Farmers Reservoir and Irrigation
Company (I)
"The water court shall approve an application for a change of
water rights if 'such change .

..

will not injuriously affect the owner of

or persons entitled to use water under a vested water right or a
decreed conditional water right.' The applicant for a change of water
right bears the initial burden of establishing a prima facie case that
the proposed change will not have an injurious effect on others' water
rights. Once the applicant successfully meets this initial burden, the
opposers have the burden of going forward with evidence that the
proposed change will result in injury to existing water rights. If the
opposers present contrary evidence of injury, then the ultimate
burden of showing the absence of injurious effect by a preponderance
of the evidence remains with the applicant. The issue of injurious
effect is inherently fact specific, and we require the water court to
make findings on this issue. In evaluating whether a proposed change
will have an injurious effect, the water court may have to make
determinations about the historic beneficial consumptive use of the
water rights in question.
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We defer to the water court's findings of fact unless the evidence
is wholly insufficient to support those determinations. This is a highly
deferential standard that recognizes the water court's unique ability to
evaluate the evidence and make factual determinations in complex
water allocation decisions. We defer to the water court's finding that
FRICO's post-trial tables and calculations were new evidence because
they were not introduced at trial. Therefore, in evaluating each of
FRICO's arguments, we rely only upon the evidence presented at
trial, not the tables and calculations in FRICO's proposed decree, to
determine whether the record supports the trial court's findings."
City and County of Broomfield v. Farmers Reservoir and
Irrigation Company, 235 P.3d 296, 299-300 (2010).
Streu v. City of Colorado Springs
"The decision to dismiss an action for failure to prosecute lies
within the sound discretion of the water court. We review the water
court's dismissal under an abuse-of-discretion standard. Under this
standard, we reverse a trial court's determination only if it was
'manifestly arbitrary, unreasonable, or unfair.' It is not necessary that
we agree with the trial court's decision.
The plaintiff bears the burden of prosecuting a case 'in due
course without unusual or unreasonable delay.' An unreasonable
delay or lack of diligence in prosecution will justify dismissal, unless
the plaintiff presents mitigating circumstances sufficient to excuse the
delay.
We have articulated several nonexclusive factors that -a court
should consider when evaluating a motion to dismiss for failure to
prosecute. These factors include: the length of the delay; the reason
for the delay; any prejudice that may result to other parties; any
difficulties in trying the case that may have resulted from the delay;
and the extent to which the applicant has renewed efforts to
prosecute the case.
Based on the record before us, and considering the many factors
that support dismissal, we cannot conclude that the water court acted
in a manifestly arbitrary or unreasonable manner when it dismissed
Streu's case with prejudice for failure to prosecute. Although we may
disagree with the water court, its decision to dismiss under these
circumstances does not exceed the bounds of its rationally available
choices.
[T]he seventeen-month delay far exceeded the time required to
establish a prima facie case of failure to prosecute. Our courts have
affirmed dismissals for failure to prosecute following similar, and on
occasion shorter, delays.
Streu v. City of Colorado Springs, No. 09SA251, § III, 11 2-6
(announced Sept. 20, 2010) (citations omitted).
The lengthy delay in prosecution also prejudiced the opposers.
They invested time and money to answer Streu's application. They

WATER LAWREVIEW

170

Volumel14

retained counsel, investigated Streu's claims, and filed timely
responses before the proceedings came to a seventeen-month halt.
[TIhe record indicates that Streu failed to prosecute this case
diligently since its inception. The district court ordered Streu to file
her application in water court by February 18, 2007. She filed this
case two months late, on April 18, 2007. Streu also missed the first
two deadlines set forth in the case management order. She did not
exchange information with the opposers on August 29, 2007, and she
filed her disclosures thirty-three days late. When she filed her
disclosures, she failed to include a request for extension of time to file
late disclosures, and she failed to explain the reason for the monthlong delay."

Id. at § III,

[ 12, 14.

City and County of Broomfield v. Farmers Reservoir and Irrigation
Co. (II)
"The rule enumerates three groups that are generally exempt
from paying costs: the State of Colorado, its officers, and its agencies.
By enumerating these three groups that are explicitly exempt from
costs, the statute implies that all other groups are not exempt from
costs. A mutual ditch company, which acts in a representative capacity
for many municipalities, does not fall within the specified groups that
are exempt from costs....
City and County of Broomfield v. Farmers Reservoir and
Irrigation Co. (II), No. 09SA269, § III. A., 1 4, Announced Sept. 27,
2010(citations omitted).
Because the right to oppose another's water application is not a
fundamental constitutional right and because ... classification of
governmental and non-governmental entities does not create a
suspect class, we review the award of costs against a nongovernmental agency pursuant to the rational basis test. Under that
test, we consider whether the rule is rationally related to a legitimate
state purpose.
Rule 54(d) permits the water court to award costs against private
persons but not against the state or its subdivisions. Under the state
constitution, the court possesses plenary authority to create
procedural rules in both civil and criminal cases. The purpose of this
distinction is to protect the public treasury, which, in turn, is
consistent with the concept that the government cannot be sued
without its consent (i.e., sovereign immunity). The legislature alone
has the power to balance the interests between protecting the public
against excessive financial burdens and allowing individual parties to
sue the government.
If the classification between governmental and non-governmental
entities under Rule 54(d) did not exist, then the court would possess
the discretion to award litigation costs against the government when it
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is not the prevailing party. The government would face the potential
of paying its opponent's costs in addition to its own when it pursues a
case that is ultimately unsuccessful. Thus, the classification between
governmental and non-governmental entities . .. is rationally related

to the goal of protecting the public treasury because -the rule prohibits
a water court from awarding costs to a party who prevails against the
government. Hence, we hold that Rule 54(d) violates neither due
process nor equal protection guarantees contained in the United
States and Colorado Constitutions."

Id. at § III. E., 1 1-3.

